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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD G. FOOTE, SHIRLEY 
P. FOOTE, and VENICE THEATRE 
CORPORATION, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
NEWTON A. TAYLOR, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
Case No. 16533 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages brought by Plaintiffs-
Respondent's Richard G. Foote, his wife, Shirley P. Foote, for 
and in behalf of the Venice Theatre Corporation. Plaintiff-
Respondents claim that the Defendant-Appellant, Newton Taylor 
breached a real property lease and personal property purchase 
agreement which caused subs~antial loss of rents and monthly 
payments. In addition, Plaintiff-Respondent' claim damages to 
the real property. Defendant-Appellant counter-claimed for 
damages alleging prior breach by Plaintiff-Respondents. 
-1-
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial court, the Honorable David Sam, District Judge, 
presiding, held as follows: That the real property lease, and 
the personal property purchase were two separate agreements; 
that the Defendant-Appellant breached the contracts; that 
the Defendant-Appellants Motion to Strike damage allegations 
except for the claim for liquidatrd damages expressed in the 
personal property agreement, should be denied; that the Plaintif~ 
Respondent had been injured for loss of fair rental to building 
and equipment in -che amount of $2,052.16; that Plaintiff'Respondent, 
"did not clearly show what damage was suffered" to the real 
property, but was none-the-less entitled to retain Defendant-
Appellant's $1,000.00 dov.:npayment "for any such damage;" and 
that Plaintiff-Respondent was entitled to $1,150.00 for Attorneys 
fees and court costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court's decision 
that the real property lease and the personal property purchase 
were two separate agreements, and a reversal of the denial of 
Appellant's Motion for damages to be limited to the liquidated 
·amages expressed in the personal property agreement. 
In the event this Court does not reverse the trial judge's 
ecision that there were two agreements, then Appellant seeks 
a ruling that the liquidated damages provision would still apply 
to the personal property agreCC'ment, and the tot a 1 award should be 
reduced in accordance with that determination. 
-2-
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In the event this Court does not reverse the trial 
judge's decision that there were two agreements, then Appella: 
seeks a ruling that the liquidated damages provision would still 
apply to the personal property agreement, and the total award 
should be reduced in accordance with that determination. 
In the event this Court does not grant any of the relief 
prayed for above, then Appellant seeks a reversal of the award 
of Appellant's downpayment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
During the sununer of 1978, Mr. Newton Taylor investigated 
the possibility of establishing an Italian Place Restaurant in 
Nephi, Utah. Pursuant to his investigation he entered into 
negotiations with Richard G. Foote as to the possibility 
of acquiring the Venice Theater and Venice Pizza Hut, which were 
both in the same building. Mr. Taylor made it known that he was 
not interested in the theater, but was willing to take it along 
with the restaurant if necessary. Mr. Foote made it clear 
that it was his position that they would both have to be taken 
together. 
On or about the 7th day of August, 1978, the parties signed 
an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase covering the 
personal property (restaurant and theater equipment) contained 
within the Venice Theater and Venice Pizza Hut. The signed 
document contained an additional typed-in-clause which stated: 
"This sale shall be accompanied by the attached Lease-Purchase 
!i[',rl'<'rntent on the bui1uing located at 86 South t!ain, Nephi, Utah. 
Said lease agreement 
-3-
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was signed on or about the 11th day of August, four days after 
the Earnest Money Document was signed. Uncontroverted testimony 
by both parties during the lower court trial indicated that 
although there were two documents, it was all part of the same 
agreement. 
The Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase included 
provisions for downpayment, monthly payments, ~nd other related 
terms. Mr. Taylor was required to make a $1,000.00 downpayment 
and additional monthly payments of $304.29 per month. The 
contract provided that, "In the event the purchaser fails to pay 
the balance of said purchase price complete said purchase 
as herein provided, the amounts paid hereon, shall, at the option 
of the Seller, be retained as liquidated damages." 
The document containing the lease on the real property 
also included payment provisions anc c·ther related terms. By 
the terms of the lease, Mr. Taylor was to pay Mr. Foote $240.00 
per month for the lease of the building. It should be noted that 
the lease also contained an option to '•uy which could be exercised 
by Mr. Taylor, and provided that all lease payments made prior to 
the exercise of the option would apply to the purchase, if the 
option were exercised. 
At the time of the signing of tL above-mentioned documents 
it was orally agreed upon by the parties that the roof over the 
restaurant was in need of repair, and that said repair should be 
the financial responsibility of Mr. Foote. Apparently, there was 
some misunderstanding between the parties as to wht'ther Mr. TayJo: 
-4-
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would have the roof repaired and take the cost thereof out 
of the rent payments, or Mr. Foote would arrange to have the 
roof repaired on his own. This misunderstanding resulted in no 
action being taken to repair the roof until sometime near the 
end of October. 
During this period of time from August until late October, 
Mr. Taylor operated the theater, but was unable to open the rest-
aurant. He had started renovation of the restaurant kitchen 
and had obtained a franchise for an Italian Place Restaurant. 
As part of his franchise package, he was to receive restaurant 
kitchen equipment. However, Mr. Taylor could no1: take delivery 
of the equipment while the kitchen roof still leaked. Therefore, 
the restaurant could not be opened as long as the roof leaked over 
the kitchen area. 
In October of 1978, there were several communications between 
Mr. Taylor and Mr. Foote concerning the roof repair. Some of 
the communications were made in person and some through counsel 
of both parties. Mr. Taylor refused to make any rent or purchase 
payments until the roof was repaired. Mr. Foote refused to have 
the roof repaired until the payments were made. Sometime 
during these communications Mr. Taylor made it clear that if the 
roof was not repaired by October 31, 1978, he would consider 
the contract null and void. On October 31, 1978, Mr. Taylor 
entered the kitchen of the restaurant and could still see light 
thrc•ugh the roof, he immediately vacated the premises. 
-5-
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ARGuMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EARNEST 
MONEY RECEIPT AND OFFER TO PURCHASE FOR EQUIPMENT, AND 
THE LEASE AGREEMENT TO THE VENICE THEATRE AND PIZZA PARLOR, 
CONSTITUTED TWO SEPARATE AGREEMENTS WHICH WERE NOT MERGED. 
It is practically a universal rule of law that where 
two or more writings are executed at or near the same time, 
in the course of the same transaction and concerning the same 
subject matter, they should be read together. First National 
Bank of Hutchenson vs. Kaiser, 222 Kan. 274, 564 P. 2d 493 
(1977). The Colorado Supreme Court in interpreting this rule has 
gone so far as to say that not only should each agreement be 
construed in light of the other, but that a fundamental principle 
of construction requires that they be treated "as one and the same 
instrument," Harty v. Hoerner, 170 Coln. 506, 463 P.2d 313 
(1969) (emphasis added). The rule has ~n held to apply even 
when the writings do not expressly refE_ to each other. 
Haspray v. Pasarelli, 79 Nev. 203,380 P.2d 919 (1963). 
The validity of this rule in Utah was recently affirmed 
by this Court in Bullfrog Marina, Inc. vs. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261, 
501 P.2d 266 (1972). The facts of thac case are remarkably 
analogous to the facts of the case at bar. The Plaintiff, 
Bullfrog Marina, Inc. had negotiated with the Defendant, Lentz 
to operate a houseboat business at Lake Powell. In order to 
-6-
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avoid certain restrictions governing the Plaintiff's concessions, 
the parties entered into two agreements, one styled after an 
employment contract wherein the Plaintiff employed the 
Defendant to operate a houseboat rental service; the other 
designated a lease whereby the Plaintiff leased three house-
boats from the Defendant. Both contracts were to become effective 
on the same date and were to run for the same term of two 
years. 
At trial, the trial Court found that the Defendant would not 
have leased the boats to the Plaintiff unless he could operate 
the houseboat rental service, and due to the relationship 
between the lease and the employment contract, the trial judge 
held that the two writings should be considered as one agreement. 
In affirming the decision of the trial Court, this Court stated, 
.... here two or more instruments are 
executed by the same parties contemporaneously, 
or at different times in the course of the same 
transaction, and concern the same subject matter, 
they will be read and construed together so 
far as determining the respective rights and 
interests of the parties, although they do not 
in terms refer to each other. 501 P.2d at 271 
The facts of the instant case are much more compelling 
than those in Bullfrog Marina, supra. At trial both the 
~laintiff and the Defendant testified that the two writings 
constituted "one transaction, one agreement, and two documents 
put together represent[ing] the total agreement." (T@ 42,45,70). 
-7-
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In addition, the Defendant testified that his main 
interest and concern was in the case of the restaurant 
facilities and that the offer to purchase the theatre equip-
ment was due to his perception of the lease of the restaurant 
and the purchase of the equipment as a "package deal", (T @105), 
Indeed, the very documents themselves indicate that intention; 
one clause of the purchase agreement provides that "sale contingent 
upon buyer .•.. approving lease agreement attached to contract." 
In the Bullfrogt~ina case, this Court characterized the 
question of the inTegration of a single document as a factual one. 
501 P.2d at 270. In the present case, not only was there no 
evidence that the two documents constituted separate 
agreements, there was an abundance of uncontroverted testimony 
that the two writings together constituted the terms of the 
agreement between the parties. The holding of the trial judge 
that the two agreements were separate and not merged was contra~ 
both to the law of this state, and to the uncontroverted evidence 
produced at trial, and should be reversed. 
POINT II. 
THE PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT OF RECOVERY AGAINST 
DEFENDANT IS LIMITED TO RETENTION OF 'l HE DEFENDANT • S DOWN-
PAYMENT PURSUANT TO THE LIQUIDATED DA~IAGES CLAUSE OF THIS 
AGREEMENT. 
Damages: 
(continued on page 9) 
-8-
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It is the well-settled law of this State that when a 
contract for sale contains a liquidated damages clause, exer-
cisable at the option of the seller, any retention of past pay-
ments constitutes a binding election by the Seller to rely 
on the liquidated damages clause as his sole remedy. Dowding v. 
Land Funding Ltd., 555 P.2d 957 (Utah 1976) and cases cited 
therein. 
In this regard, counsel for the Defendant made a timely 
motion to strike the damages alleged in the complaint, (T at 101) 
which motion was subsequently denied. In ruling on the motion, 
the trial judge distinguished the cases presented to him on the 
basis that those cases dealt with contra~ts which were 
disaffirmed at their relative inception, whereas the contract 
at issue in this case had undergone partial performance. This 
distinction, however, runs counter to both the express terms of 
the agreement and the underlying purposes of the law. 
The portion of the contract relevant here, is found 
in the document entitled "Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase", and provides: 
In the event the purchaser fails to pay 
the balance of said purchase price or complete 
said purchase as herein provided, the 
amounts paid herein shall, at the option of 
the Seller, be retained as liquidated and 
agreed damages. 
This clause was further explained in a subsequent provision 
-9-
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which states that "$1,000.00 is non-refundable if buyer 
is unable to perform on contract •••. " (emphasis added). 
These two provisions make it clear that the breach which 
triggers the liquidated damages clause is not a repudiation 
of the contract before any execution thereof but any failure 
to complete the purchase "as herein provided!" Therefore, the 
rule established by the cases cited supra should also apply in 
the present case. 
In addition, to hold as the trial court did contravenes 
the policy which forms the basis of the law. In Close vs. 
Blumenthal, 11 Lt.ah 2d 51, 354 P.2d 856 (1960) the Court 
noted that the option of retaining liquidated damages was for 
the sole benefit of the seller and that the seller will always 
choose the option to his advantage and to the disadvantage of 
the buyer. 
"Under those circumstances the clause should 
be strictly applied against the seller and he should be held to 
meet its requirements with exactness." 354 P.2d at 857. 
In line with this strict application, the Court states 
that: "where there was an option to be exercised rccgarding 
the forfeiture of the deposit as liquidated damages, the fact 
that the money WJ.S kept was incontrovertible evidence that the 
Seller had exercised the option to keep it .... " [emphasis 
added) That a contract is breached after partial execution 
-10-
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not change the underlying policies. The seller still has 
the option to elect to retain liquidated damages. According 
to the terms of the contract, these liquidated damages can 
include not only the deposit but all payments received up to 
the time of the breach. The possibility of overreacting by 
a Seller still exists. That the parties began performance 
on the contract should not be sufficient to justify the rejection 
of the rule enunciated in Andreasen vs. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d. 370, 
335 P.2d 404 (1959) and recently affirmed in Dowding v. Land 
Funding Ltd., supra., that a binding election has been made 
when a party to a breached contract retains monies and makes no 
offer to return them. 
In the present case, the Plaintiff himself testified that 
he did not return any monies paid to him under the contract, nor 
did he make any offer to return them. (T at 46). 
This case, then, falls squarely under the rationale 
of Andreasen, and Close, and the trial judge erred in denying the 
motion to strike damages. 
In the event this court holds that the two documents involved 
here are two separate and distinct agreements, it should be noted 
that the $1,000.00 down-payment and the liquidated damages 
provision run to the agreement to purchase the equipment and not 
to the lease of the property. For this reason, any damages 
arising out of the breach of contract to purchase the equipment 
must be limited to the $1,000.00 deposit made on that contract. 
-11-
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In addition, if the documents are separate and distinct, 
it would be error for the trial judge to apply the $1,000.00 
retained on the purchase of the equipment, as compensation 
for damage to the real property. The deposit would have no 
relationship to the lease agreement. 
Attorneys Fees: 
In Andreasen v. Hansen, supra., a case where liquidated 
damages was held to be the only available remedy, this Court 
stated that "the award of attorneys fees is conditioned upon 
the necessity for incurring them and upon the Plaintiff's 
being justified in their demands." 335 P.2nd at 407. In that 
case, the Court reversed the award of attorney's fees 
based on the reasoning that as recovery of liquidated damages 
did not justify the retention of an attorney or pursual of a 
lawsuit, no compensation could be awarded for those expenses. 
The same reasoning should apply in the instant case. As the 
Plaintiff's sole remedy was the retention of liquidated damages, 
the attorney's fees incurred in this case are unjustified and 
therefore, the award of attorney's fees should be reversed. 
Again, in the event that this Court should find the two 
documents constitute two separate agreements, the above 
reasoning should nonetheless apply to that agreement 
entitled "Earnest. Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase" and the 
award of attorney's fees should be reduced by that amount 
-12-
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incurred by the attorney in the enforcement of that agree-
ment. 
POINT III 
IN THE EVENT THIS COURT HOLDS AGAINST POINTS I AND II 
AS HEREIN STATED, THEN THE AWARD OF THE DOWNPAYMENT TO THE 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT BE UPHELD: SAID AWARD BEING CONTRARY TO LAW 
AND FACT. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT SPECIFICALLY RULED THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO CLEARLY SHOW WHAT DAMAGE WAS SUFFERED BY 
DEFENDANT'S RENOVATION OF THE PIZZA PARLOR; THEREFORE, THE 
AWARDING OF DEFENDANT'S $1,000.00 DOWN-PAYMENT "FOR ANY SUCH 
DAMAGE" WAS CONTRARY TO LAW. 
In all civil suits the burden is on the party seeking relief 
to show by a preponderance of the evidence any damages dought. 
In actions by a landlord against a lessee for recovery of waste 
or damage to property, the damages and amount thereof must 
be shown with reasonable certainty. 
The burden is on the Plaintiff in an 
action for waste to show that waste has 
been committed to his injury, and to show 
with reasonable certainty the particular 
act or acts of waste, as well as the amount 
of damage, if any, to the freehold. 78 Am. 
Jur. 2d Waste§ 41 (1975), emphasis added. 
To warrant a recovery based on the value of 
property injured or destroyed, there must 
be proof of its value or evidence of such 
facts as will warrant a determination of its 
value with reasonable certainty. 22 Am Jur. 
2d. Damages § 201 (1965), emphasis added. 
In this acrion, the Plaintiff did not show the amount or 
-13-
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extent of damage with reasonable certainty and the lower 
Court so held. In the DECISION the lower court specifically 
stated: "Plaintiff's claim for rennovation or repair of 
work started by the Defendant in the Pizza Parlor did not 
clearly show what damage was suffered." 
In the CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, it was stated: "the Plaintiff's 
claim for rennovation or repair of work started by the Defendant 
in the pizza parlor did not clearly show the extent of damage 
suffered." If the Plaintiff "did not clearly show what 
damage was suffered," then he obviously failed to show with 
"reasonable certainty" the damage suffered, and should have 
been precluded from recovery. 
However, after finding that the Plaintiff had not shown 
what damage was suffered, the court awarded Plaintiff the 
$1,000.00 downpayment made by the Defendant "for any such 
damage". Again, the words "any such damage" implying that 
the damages had not been shown with reasonable certainty. 
This award of the downpayment was completely unjustified 
and contrary to law. After having held that the Plaintiff had 
failed to clearly show what damage was suffered, an 
award by the Court would necessarily be arbitrary and based 
solely upon the whims of the trial judge. It is this type 
of award that the rule requiring "reasonable certainty" is 
designed to prevent. It has become well recognized that render- ' 
-14-
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ing judgment for substantial damages without proof of the damages 
actually suffered is reversible error. See, Rollins vs. Rayhill, 
200 Okl. 192, 191 P. 2d 934 (1948). Therefore, the award of 
the $1,000.00 downpayment to the Plaintiff should be reversed 
on this basis alone. 
B. EVEN IF THERE IS SOME BASIS FOR AWARDING DAMAGES 
AFTER HAVING RULED THEY WERE NOT CLEARLY SHOWN, THE AWARD OF 
THE DOWNPAYMENT MUST STILL BE REVERSED BECAUSE ANY DAMAGES 
FOUND WOULD BE BASED ON MERE SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE. 
In Bunnell vs. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597, 
602 (1962), this Court held that "damages' cannot be found from 
mere speculative and conjectural evidence." In this case, 
the evidence concerning damages to the restaurant kitchen was 
completely speculative. 
The only testimony that was given during the trial to 
establish the amount of damages to the kitchen was given by 
the Plaintiff, Mr. Foote, and be admitted on cross examination 
that be was guessing as to damages. His testimony was as follows: 
(T. at 27, and 58) 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
Q: 
A: 
do you have a judgment as to what the 
approximate cost will be to repair the kitchen? 
Well, I am just hoping that that figure would 
come in around $1,500.00. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
----- -~ 
Q: When you are saying that you are hoping that 
the repair figure in the kitchen would be around 
-15-
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A. 
$1,500.00, I take it what you are telling us is 
that it might be more than that and it might be 
less, and that is a guess that you have given? 
Yes. 
No testimony was given as to specifically what the hoped 
for figure of $1,500.00 was to cover. It is not clear from the 
record whether the money would be used to finish the remodeling 
that the Defendant had started, to rebuild the kitchen to the 
condition it was before the lease, or to construct a kitchen 
that would incorporate aspects of both (See T. at 26, 27) 
If the kitchen was to be finished in accordance with what 
the Defendant had started, or if it were to be completed 
incorporating aspects of both, then the remodeling that the 
Defendant had commenced could not reasonably be considered to 
be damaging at all. In addition, there was no testimony 
to indicate that even if the kitchen was going to be rebuilt 
to the condition it was before the lease, that the expenses the 
$1,500.00 would cover would be only those that were necessary, 
and not those that could be considered extravagant expenses. 
Yet, the law is well established that: 
Damages recoverable by a landlord as the cost 
of restoration in an action for waste are generally 
limited to the reasonable expenses of restoring 
the property to its former condition, and they do 
not necessarily cover all that the lessor chose to 
spend or was obliged to spend under the circumstances. 
Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 1106, 1113 (1962). 
-16-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Without evidence beyond a mere guess, and without 
evidence to indicate how the guessed at amount of money was to be 
used, the award of the downpayment to the Plaintiff was based 
purely on speculation. This is evidenced by the fact that the 
trial court did not determine the amount of damage, did not award 
the $1,500.00 prayed for, but simply awarded the downpayment. 
There was absolutely no evidence presented at trial that 
would justify the awarding of the $1,000.00 downpayment, as op-
posed to an award of $900.00, $800.00, $700.00, or any other 
amount lower than the $1,500.00 prayed for. If there was evidence 
of damages at all (which there was not), it would be for the 
• $1,500.00 that was prayed for, and not for the arbitrary amount 
of the downpayment. 
The above mentioned facts and testimony, coupled with 
the decision of the trial court, indicate that the lower court 
arrived at the arbitrary amount of the downpayment merely because 
it was convenient. Since the purpose of damages is to award just 
compensation, they should not be determined solely on the basis of 
judicial convenience. This amounts to the worst kind of speculation; 
i.e., awards not based on the evidence presented, but on the desire 
of the trial court not to have to deal with the evidence presented. 
Therefore, the award of the $1,000.00 downpayment to the Plaintiff 
should be reversed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Defendant-Appellant contends that his Points on 
Appeal are well taken, and the requested relief should be 
granted on the merits of the case. 
Mailing Certification: 
Respectfully submitted, 
J).jU 
D. JOHN MUSSELMAN 
Attorney for Appellants 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing Brief to Milton T. 
Harmon, Attorney for Respondent, 36 South Main Street, Nephi, 
Utah 84648, this _.:]_Js/ day of May, 1980. 
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